Constitutions and Conflict Management in Africa
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Constitutions and Conflict Management in Africa
Preventing Civil War Through Institutional Design

Edited by Alan J. Kuperman

304 pages | 6 x 9 | 22 illus.
Cloth 2015 | ISBN 978-0-8122-4658-2 | $65.00s | £42.50 | Add to cart
Ebook 2015 | ISBN 978-0-8122-9033-2 | $65.00s | £42.50 | About | Add to cart
A volume in the National and Ethnic Conflict in the 21st Century series

"Based on careful case studies and new data, this excellent volume reflects an important new set of ideas relating to constitutional design and conflict."—Terrence Lyons, George Mason University
Each of Africa's countries has a different constitutional design, is characterized by a unique culture and history, and faces different stresses that threaten to undermine political stability. Presenting the first database of constitutional design in all African countries, along with seven original case studies, Constitutions and Conflict Management in Africa explores the types of domestic political institutions that can buffer societies from destabilizing changes that otherwise increase the risk of violence.

With detailed comparative studies of Burundi, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan, and Zimbabwe, contributing scholars identify key turning points at which a state's political institutions either mitigated or escalated the effects of economic, environmental, demographic, and political shocks. They find that stability can be promoted by various constitutional designs—not only by accommodative institutions that encourage decentralization and multiculturalism, but also by the integrative, centralized designs that characterize the constitutions of most African countries. The greatest danger may arise from partial or inequitable accommodation that can exacerbate societal tensions, culminating in violence up to and including civil war and genocide. Accordingly, Constitutions and Conflict Management in Africa cautions against the typical international prescription for radical reform to replace Africa's existing constitutions with accommodative designs, instead prescribing more gradual constitutional reform to strengthen liberal institutions, such as strong judiciaries and independent electoral commissions. This detailed and methodical volume provides vital lessons for fostering democracy and reducing civil conflict via constitutional reform in Africa and beyond.

Contributors: Justin Orlando Frosini, Gilbert M. Khadiagala, Alan J. Kuperman, Karly Kupferberg, Eli Poupko, Eghosa E. Osaghae, Andrew Reynolds, Filip Reyntjens, Arame Tall, Hillary Thomas-Lake, Stefan Wolff, I. William Zartman.

Alan J. Kuperman is Associate Professor at the LBJ School of Public Affairs, University of Texas at Austin.

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