The Markets for Force

The Markets for Force compares the markets for private military and security services across the globe, examining how local markets evolve and interact with regional politics and geostrategic context.

The Markets for Force
Privatization of Security Across World Regions

Edited by Molly Dunigan and Ulrich Petersohn

2015 | 224 pages | Cloth $55.00
Political Science
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Table of Contents

List of Abbreviations
Foreword
—Deborah Avant

Chapter 1. Introduction
Ulrich Petersohn and Molly Dunigan
Chapter 2. Diverse Markets for Force in Latin America: From Argentina to Guatemala
—Kristina Mani
Chapter 3. The Military Protection Markets in Peru and Ecuador: A Detailed Analysis
—Maiah Jaskoski
Chapter 4. The Market for Force in the United Kingdom: The Recasting of the Monopoly of Violence and the Management of Force as a Public-Private Enterprise
—Carlos Ortiz
Chapter 5. The Market for Private Force in the Czech Republic
—Oldr˙ich Bureš
Chapter 6. Informal but Diverse: The Market for Exported Force from Russia and Ukraine
—Olivia Allison
Chapter 7. The Markets for Force in Afghanistan
—Jake Sherman
Chapter 8. China's Managed Market for Force
—Jennifer Catallo
Chapter 9. The Canadian Market for Force
—Christopher Spearin
Chapter 10 The Market for Force in the United States
—Scott Fitzsimmons
Chapter 11. The Causes and Consequences of Different Types of Markets for Force
—Molly Dunigan and Ulrich Petersohn

Appendix: Testing the Relative Explanatory Power of the "Market Types" Argument
—Ulrich Petersohn and Molly Dunigan

List of Contributors
Index
Acknowledgments


Excerpt [uncorrected, not for citation]

Foreword
Deborah Avant

As armed men took over two airports in Crimea after the ouster of embattled Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich in February 2014, some reports suggested they were forces employed by Vnevedomstvenaya Okhrana, a private security contracting bureau inside the Russian interior ministry that hires forces to protect Russian Navy installations and assets in Crimea ("Russian 'Blackwater'" 2014). If this is indeed the case, what can we expect of Russian security firms? Are they shoring up the Russian state's monopoly on force or undermining it? Will their use lead to greater public security or less? This volume endeavors to address just these kinds of questions.

A significant literature has amassed focusing on the global growth of a market for force and particular manifestations of it in individual cases. Fewer, however, have systematically examined the variations within this market. Molly Dunigan and Ulrich Petersohn set out to do just that. They pose a typology of different kinds of markets: a neoliberal market, a hybrid market, and a racketeering market. They and their colleagues then analyze how these different market forms should impact the state's monopoly on force and the provision of security as a public good and investigate how the markets have affected individual cases. Though some will, no doubt, take issue with their formulations and predictions, Dunigan, Petersohn, and their colleagues take a step toward better describing and understanding the various forms that marketized security takes and the consequences of these different forms.

Beyond the general formulations, this volume also offers new empirical detail on cases from Latin America to Europe to North America to Asia. Much of the analysis in the literature on the private military and security industry has focused on the United States and Europe or on various countries in Africa. This volume includes cases from less studied regions. The inclusion of a broader array of cases and regional overviews is a welcome addition, even though reliable data on many of these cases is hard to obtain. Particularly intriguing are the different relationships between governments and militaries and the various private actors—from state- owned and -managed security companies in China, to militaries working for private sector extractive industries in Ecuador and Peru, to the overlap between warlord forces and private security companies in Afghanistan.

Though this volume presents convincing evidence of variation in market dynamics across regions and cases, it also tells of increasing interaction between these more local markets and global forces and firms. Following these interactions will be important for understanding how both the global market and associated markets unfold. Regardless, the analyses in this volume make a compelling argument that marketization in the security sector is vast and varied. I hope it generates much research in this important area.